End-to-End Encryption Keys

Traffic between your machines can be end-to-end encrypted with keys the relay does not issue, so even a relay that tried to sit in the middle could not read it.


Why a key

Each end makes a fresh key pair and the two ends agree on a session key, so the relay only ever carries ciphertext. Fresh keys alone are not signed: a relay that replaced them with its own could sit in the middle. So every handshake is also authenticated by a key the relay does not hold. Your machine certificate cannot do this job: the relay issued it and sees it on every connection.

Prerequisites

1. Organisation sessions

An organisation has its own root and issuer, on a machine of yours, not on the relay. Each machine enrols with nfltr org join and gets a certificate of that issuer. nfltr cat with --allow-group (cat pipe, cat cp, cat forward, cat serve --exec) runs TLS between the two machines with those certificates; the relay forwards TLS records.

2. HTTP tunnels

nfltr http ends TLS on your machine by default, so the relay forwards encrypted bytes. To use a certificate of your own, give --e2ee-cert and --e2ee-key.

3. How to verify

nfltr org status shows the organisation's root, issuer and CRL. A machine whose certificate the issuer revoked (nfltr org revoke) is refused in every organisation session once the CRL reaches the other end.

Agent-to-agent keys

When the issuer's machine holds an agent-to-agent root key, nfltr org join also writes that machine's agent-to-agent key, sealed to the machine's key (Organisations). Those keys and their revocation belong to nfltr-orch, which is not publicly available.

Next